Abstract. A Leibniz class is a class of logics closed under the formation of termequivalent logics, compatible expansions, and non-indexed products of sets of logics. We study the complete lattice of all Leibniz classes, called the Leibniz hierarchy. In particular, it is proved that the classes of truth-equational and assertional logics are meet-prime in the Leibniz hierarchy, while the classes of protoalgebraic and equivalential logics are meet-reducible. However, the last two classes are shown to be determined by Leibniz conditions consisting of meet-prime logics only.
Introduction
When ordered under intepretability [24] , the class of (propositional) logics forms a preorder. Its associated partial order Log, called the poset of all logics, consists of equivalence classes of equi-interpretable logics. Building on this formalism, in this paper we introduce and study the notion of a Leibniz class of logics.
From an order-theoretic point of view, Leibniz classes are classes of logics that can be faithfully identified with the upsets of Log that are closed under infima of arbitrarily large sets. Equivalently, they can be characterized in terms of closure properties as the classes of logics closed under the formation of term-equivalent logics, compatible expansions, and non-indexed products of sets of logics (see [24] for the relevant definitions).
Part of the interest of Leibniz classes lies in the fact that they allow to clarify the yet informal concept of the Leibniz hierarchy, i.e. a taxonomy in which logics are classified in terms of syntactic principles (up to now recognized on empirical grounds) corresponding to the behaviour of the so-called Leibniz operator [12, 18, 20, 19] . More precisely, the road we take is to identify the Leibniz hierarchy with the complete lattice of Leibniz classes ordered under inclusion. Remarkably, this abstraction preserves the fact that Leibniz classes are collections of logics globally satisfying some syntactic principles, here called Leibniz conditions, consisting of special sequences of logics indexed by all ordinals.
One of the main advantages of this point of view is that it allowed to unify in [25] the theory of the Leibniz hierarchy with that of the Maltsev hierarchy of universal algebra, i.e. a taxonomy in which varieties are classified by means of syntactic principles related to the structure of congruence lattices [22, 26, 28, 30, 35, 36, 38] .
In this paper we restrict our attention to the study of Leibniz classes. First we show that the majority of classes of logics traditionally associated with the Leibniz hierarchy happen to be Leibniz classes. Among them we count the classes of protoalgebraic, equivalential, and assertional logics, whose respective Leibniz conditions are also found (Theorems 3.4, 3.7, and 3.11). Then we begin an order-theoretic investigation of the Leibniz hierarchy, understood as the complete lattice of all Leibniz classes. More precisely, we focus on Date: February 19, 2020. the problem of determining whether the most prominent Leibniz classes are meet-prime or meet-irreducible elements of the Leibniz hierarchy. Affirmative answers to these questions can then be interpreted as stating that the Leibniz classes under consideration capture primitive or fundamental concepts. Similar problems were studied in the setting of the Maltsev hierarchy for instance in [21] (see also [2, 29, 37] ).
Some of our results can be summarized as follows. On the one hand the Leibniz classes of truth-equational and assertional logics are shown to be meet-prime (Theorems 5.10 and 5.11). On the other hand, it is proved that the classes of protoalgebraic and equivalential logics are meet-reducible (Theorems 6.7 and 6.7). This negative result is compensated by the observation that the Leibniz condition determining the class of protoalgebraic (resp. equivalential) logics consists of logics whose equivalence classes are meet-prime in the poset Log (Theorems 7.2 and 7.5).
Leibniz conditions
We use the same notation as in [24] . Recall that OR is the class of ordinals. Definition 2.1. A strong Leibniz condition Φ is simply a logic Φ . A logic is said to satisfy Φ if Φ , and the class of logics satisfying Φ is denoted by Log(Φ). Similarly, a Leibniz condition Φ is a class {Φ α : α ∈ OR} of strong Leibniz conditions such that if α β, then Φ β Φ α . A logic is said to satisfy Φ if Φ α for some α ∈ OR, and the class of logics satisfying Φ is denoted by Log(Φ).
Accordingly, a class K of logics is a (resp. strong) Leibniz class if it is of the form Log(Φ) for some (resp. strong) Leibniz condition Φ.
in Log, we conclude that K † is closed under infima of sets. This establishes that K † is a set-complete filter of Log. Now, from the definition of K † it follows that K ⊆ { : ∈ K † }. To prove the other inclusion, consider a logic such that ∈ K † . By the definition of K † , there is a logic ∈ K such that . Since ∈ K, there is an ordinal α such that Φ α . Since K = Log(Φ), this implies that ∈ K as desired.
(iii)⇒(ii): Suppose that ∈ K, and consider a logic that is either term-equivalent to or a compatible expansion of . By [24, Prop. 3.8] we have that and, therefore, . Since K † is an upset of Log and ∈ K † , we obtain that ∈ K † . Together with the fact that K = { :
∈ K † }, this yields ∈ K. Hence we conclude that K is closed under term-equivalence and compatible expansions.
Then consider a family { i : i ∈ I} ⊆ K. By assumption the infimum of { i : i ∈ I} in Log belongs to K † . This amounts to the fact that i∈I i ∈ K † . As K = { : ∈ K † }, we conclude that i∈I i ∈ K.
(ii)⇒(i): Consider the cumulative hierarchy {V α : α ∈ OR} of set theory. For every ordinal α we set K α := K ∩ V α and α := K α . Note that if K α = ∅, then α is the inconsistent logic in the empty language over ω variables. Also note that if α β, then K α ⊆ K β and, therefore, β α . In particular, this implies that the following is a Leibniz condition:
To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that Log(Φ) = K. To prove the right-to-left inclusion, consider a logic ∈ K. Since is a set, there is an ordinal α such that ∈ V α . This implies that ∈ K α and, therefore, that α . Hence we conclude that ∈ Log(Φ). To prove the other inclusion, consider ∈ Log(Φ). There exists an ordinal α such that α . By [24, Prop. 3.8] this implies that is term-equivalent to a compatible expansion of K α . As K α ⊆ K and K is closed under non-indexed products of sets of logics, compatible expansions, and term-equivalence, this implies ∈ K.
In this paper we identify the intuitive concept of the Leibniz hierarchy with the poset of all Leibniz classes ordered under the inclusion relation. Proposition 2.6. The Leibniz hierarchy is a complete lattice in which infima are intersections and and suprema are obtained as follows for every collection {K i : i ∈ I} of Leibniz classes, where I can be a proper class: i∈I K i = { : is a logic and j∈J j for some subset { j : j ∈ J} ⊆ i∈I K i }.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 2.2.
Remark 2.7. The statement of Proposition 2.6 presupposes the we can meaningfully speak of very large intersections and unions of classes (of logics), as the collection {K i : i ∈ I} is in general a collection of classes. However, for our purposes this problem is immaterial as we will only work with finite joins and meets of Leibniz classes.
Examples of Leibniz classes
In this section we show that a range of classes of logics, traditionally associated with the yet informal concept of the Leibniz hierarchy in abstract algebraic logic, are indeed Leibniz classes.
A logic is said to be protoalgebraic [7, 12] if there is a non-empty set 1 ∆(x, y, z) of formulas such that for every A, F ∈ Mod( ) and a, b ∈ A, a, b ∈ Ω A F ⇐⇒ ∆ A (a, b, c) ⊆ F, for every c ∈ A.
In this case, we say that ∆(x, y, z) is a set of congruence formulas with parameters for .
Theorem 3.1. Let be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent: (i) is protoalgebraic.
(ii) has theorems and Mod
There is a non-empty set of formulas ∇(x, y) such that
x, ∇(x, y) y.
In this case, the following is a set congruence formulas with parameters for :
Proof. For the equivalence between (i), (ii), and (iii), see [18, Thms. 6.7, 6 .17, and 6.57].
The fact that∇ is a set of equivalence formulas with parameters for follows from [9, Thm. 13.5] (see also [16, Prop. 3 
.2]).
Our aim is to prove that protoalgebraic logics form a Leibniz class. To this end, it is convenient to introduce the following concept: Definition 3.2. Given an infinite cardinal κ, let L κ P be the language consisting of the binary symbols { α : α < κ} and the n-ary symbols { * nα : α < κ} for 0 < n ∈ ω. We set ∇ κ (x, y) := {x α y : α < κ}. 1 In the literature the set ∆ is not required to be non-empty. However, this restriction is almost immaterial as, in a fixed language, there is a unique protoalgebraic logic with an empty ∆, namely the almost inconsistent logic [18, Prop. 6.11.5] .
The basic protoalgebraic logic of rank κ is the logic κ P formulated on (i): As a special instance of (ii) we obtain that if κ P for some infinite cardinal κ |L |, then is protoalgebraic. Then suppose that is protoalgebraic, and consider any infinite cardinal κ |L |. By Theorem 3.1 there is a set of formulas ∇(x, y) ⊆ Fm( ) such that ∅ ∇(x, x) and x, ∇(x, y) y.
(1) Now, observe that |∇| max{ω, |L |} κ. Since ∇ = ∅, there is a surjective map
Similarly, since |Fm L (ω)| max{ω, |L |} κ, for every 0 < n ∈ ω there is a surjective map
Observe that the maps f and {g n : 0 < n ∈ ω} can be turned in the natural way into a single translation τ of L κ P into L . Recall by Theorem 3.1 that∇ κ and∇ are sets of congruence formulas with parameters for κ P and respectively. We claim that
We begin by proving the inclusion from left to right. Consider ϕ ∈∇. There are ψ(x, y) ∈ ∇(x, y) and γ(x, z 1 , . . . ,
. . , z n−1 )). Since f and g n are surjective, there are α, β < κ such that τ( α ) = ψ(x 1 , x 2 ) and τ( * nβ ) = γ(x 1 , . . . , x n ). Clearly,
Moreover, the definition of∇ κ guarantees * nβ (x, z 1 , . . . , z n−1 ) α * nβ (y, z 1 , . . . , z n−1 ) ∈∇ κ .
Hence we conclude that ϕ ∈ τ[∇ κ ]. This establishes the inclusion from left to right in (2) .
To prove the other inclusion, consider ϕ ∈ τ[∇ κ ]. Then there are are α < κ and γ(x, z) ∈ Fm( κ P ) such that ϕ = τ(γ(x, z) α γ(y, z)). Set γ (x, z) := τ(γ(x, z)) and ψ(x, y) := τ(x α y). From the definition of∇ and the fact that f ( α ) ∈ ∇(x 1 , x 2 ), it follows
This establishes the equality in (2) .
To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that τ is an interpretation of κ P into . To this end, consider a matrix A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ). We begin by showing that A τ , F is a model of κ P . Observe that ∇(x, y) = τ[∇ κ (x, y)]. Together with (1) and A, F ∈ Mod( ), this yields that the matrix A, F is a model of the rules ∅ £ τ[∇ κ (x, x)] and x, τ[∇ κ (x, y)] £ y. As a consequence, A τ , F is a model of the rules ∅ £ ∇ κ (x, x) and x, ∇ κ (x, y) £ y, whence it is a model of κ P . Now, for every a, b ∈ A,
The above equivalences are justified as follows: the first is a consequence of the fact that A, F is reduced by Theorem 3.1(ii), the second follows from the fact that A, F ∈ Mod( ) and that∇ is a set of congruence formulas with parameters for , the third from (2), the fourth is straightforward, and the fifth from the fact that A τ , F ∈ Mod( κ P ) and that∇ κ is a set of congruence formulas with parameters for κ P . The above display implies that the congruence Ω A τ F is the identity relation. As a consequence, we obtain
. This establishes that τ is an interpretation of κ P into , as desired.
For every ordinal α, let α P be the logic ω+|α| P . Theorem 3.4. The sequence Φ = { α P : α ∈ OR} is a Leibniz condition and Log(Φ) coincides with the class of protoalgebraic logics. In particular, protoalgebraic logics form a Leibniz class.
Proof. To prove that Φ is a Leibniz condition, consider α, β ∈ OR such that α β. The logic α P is protoalgebraic by Proposition 3.6(ii). This fact and |L α | = ω + |α| ω + |β| allow us to apply Proposition 3.6(i), obtaining β P α P . Hence we conclude that Φ is a Leibniz condition. Finally, the fact that Log(Φ) is the class of protoalgebraic logics is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.6.
By Remark 2.4 we know that the collection Equiv of equivalential logics is a Leibniz class. It is therefore sensible to wonder whether we can find an intelligible Leibniz condition Φ such that Equiv = Log(Φ). This can be done with a simple adaptation of the method employed in the case of protoalgebraic logics. Definition 3.5. Given an infinite cardinal κ, let L κ E be the language consisting of the binary symbols { α : α < κ}. We set ∆ κ (x, y) := {x α y : α < κ}. The basic equivalential logic of rank κ is the logic κ E formulated on Fm L κ E (ω) determined by the following rules, stipulated for every α < κ, Proof. Condition (ii) follows from the fact that equivalential logics form a Leibniz class by Remark 2.4, while the proof of (i) is analogous to that of Proposition 3.6(i).
For every ordinal α, let α E be the logic ω+|α| E . Theorem 3.7. The sequence Φ = { α E : α ∈ OR} is a Leibniz condition and Log(Φ) coincides with the class of equivalential logics. In particular, equivalential logics form a Leibniz class.
Proof. Analogous to the one of Theorem 3.4.
A logic is said to be assertional [1, 31] if F is a singleton for every A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ).
Proposition 3.8. Let be a logic.
is assertional if and only if it has theorems and x, y, ϕ(x, z) ϕ(y, z) for every formula
The result is attributed to Suszko in [11] , see also [33] .
To prove that assertional logics form a strong Leibniz class, we need few more concepts. Definition 3.9. The basic assertional logic is the logic A formulated in countably many variables and in the language comprising just a unary connective (x), axiomatized by the rule ∅ £ (x).
A pointed set is an algebra A = A; A where A is a unary constant map on A. In this case, we denote by A * the element of A defined by the map A : A → A. Proposition 3.10. The logic A is assertional and
A is a pointed set}. Proof. Due to the poor signature of A and the fact that ∅ A (x), it is easy to see that ∅ A ϕ for every formula ϕ ∈ Fm( A ) that is not a variable. As a consequence, we obtain x, y, ϕ(x, z) ϕ(y, z) for every formula ϕ(x, z) ∈ Fm( A ). Moreover, the logic A has theorems, e.g. (x). Hence, we can apply Proposition 3.8(ii) obtaining that A is assertional.
Now we turn to prove the equality in the statement. First consider a matrix A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( A ). Since A is assertional, F = {a} for some a ∈ A. Together with the fact that (x) is a theorem, this yields A (c) = a for all c ∈ A. Hence A is a constant map on A and a = A * . This establishes the inclusion from left to right. To prove the other inclusion, let A be a pointed set. As a consequence, we obtain the following:
Theorem 3.11. Assertional logics form the strong Leibniz class Log( A ).
Proof. It suffices to show that a logic is assertional if and only if A . To prove the "if" part, suppose that A and let τ be an interpretation of A into . Then consider
Together with Proposition 3.10, this yields that F is a singleton. Hence we conclude that is assertional.
To prove the "only if' part", suppose that is assertional. From Proposition 3.8(ii) we know that has a theorem ϕ(x). Then let τ be the translation of L A into L that sends (x) to ϕ(x). We shall see that τ is an interpretation of A into . To this end, consider a matrix A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ). Since is assertional, there is a ∈ A such that F = {a}. Together with the fact that ϕ(x) is a theorem of , this implies that ϕ A is the constant map with value a. Hence A τ = A; ϕ A is essentially a pointed set B, and A τ , F = B, { B * } . By Proposition 3.10 this guarantees that A τ , F ∈ Mod ≡ ( A ). Hence we conclude that τ is an interpretation of A into .
A logic is truth-equational [31] if there is a set E(x) of equations such that for every A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ), and a ∈ A, a ∈ F ⇐⇒ A E(a).
Similarly, a logic is said to be parametrically truth-equational [27] if there is a set E(x, y) of equations such that for every A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ) with F = ∅, and a ∈ A, a ∈ F ⇐⇒ A E(a, c) for every c ∈ A.
Theorem 3.12. Parametrically truth-equational logics, and truth-equational logics form Leibniz classes.
Proof. We detail only the proof of the fact that parametrically truth-equational logics form a Leibniz class. By Theorem 2.2 it will be enough to show that parametrically truth-equational logics are closed under term-equivalence, compatible expansions, and non-indexed products of sets. The fact that they are closed under term-equivalence, and compatible expansions is clear. Then consider a family { i : i ∈ I} of parametrically truth-equational logics. For every j ∈ I, let E j (x, y) be the set of equations witnessing the fact that j is parametrically truth-equational. For every formula ϕ(x, y) of j , we denote byφ the sequence ϕ i : i ∈ I in which ϕ i = x for every i ∈ I {j}, and ϕ j = ϕ. Observe thatφ(x, y) is a basic operation of i∈I i . Bearing this in mind, we define
⇐⇒ A E(a, c) for every c ∈ A.
The above equivalences are justified as follows: the first is straightforward, the second follows from the fact the set E i (x, y) witnesses that i is parametrically truth-equational, and the third is a consequence of the fact that the projection π i : A → A i is surjective for all i ∈ I. From the display above we obtain that i∈I i is parametrically truth-equational, as desired.
Problem 1.
Is it possible to find a transparent Leibniz condition Φ such that Log(Φ) is the class of (parametrically) truth-equational logics?
A logic is said to be order algebraizable [32] if there is a set ∆(x, y) of formulas and a set E(x) of inequalities such that for every A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ) the relation A F on A defined as follows is a partial order: for every a, c ∈ A,
and for every a ∈ A, a ∈ F ⇐⇒ A,
Theorem 3.13. Order algebraizable logics, and logics with theorems form Leibniz classes.
Proof. The result can be established by checking condition (ii) of Theorem 2.2 with ideas similar to the ones in the proof of Theorem 3.12.
We expect that a Leibniz condition defining the class of order algebraizable logics could be extracted from [32, Thm. 7.1(ii)].
Remark 3.14. Recall from Proposition 2.6 that every class of logics that can be written as the intersection of two Leibniz classes is still a Leibniz class. This observation can be exploited to show that some well-known collections of logics are Leibniz classes. For instance, a logic is said to be algebraizable [8] (resp. weakly algebraizable [13] ) if is equivalential (resp. protoalgebraic) and truth-equational. From Theorems 3.4, 3.12, and 3.7 it follows that (weakly) algebraizable logics form a Leibniz class.
We conclude this section by providing some examples of collections of logics that are not Leibniz classes. By Remark 2.5 we know that every class of logics that is not closed under the formation of extensions will serve this purpose. Among these we count, for instance, the class of logics with the Craig deductive interpolation property [14] , and the class of logics with the infinite (resp. finite) Beth definability property [4, 5] .
To describe another interesting class of logics that is not a Leibniz class, recall that a logic has an algebraic semantics [8, 10] if there are a set of equations E(x) and a class of algebras K such that for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm( ),
where K is the equational consequence relative to K. Surprisingly enough, every logic is term-equivalent to one with an algebraic semantics, as shown essentially in [10, Thm.
3.1].
Together with the fact that some logics lack an algebraic semantics [6] , this yields that the class of logics with an algebraic semantics is not closed under term-equivalence, whence it is not a Leibniz class by Theorem 2.2(ii).
The reader familiar with abstract algebraic logic may be interested to know that also (fully) selfextensional, and (fully) Fregean logics [19] do not form Leibniz classes, since these collections are not closed under compatible expansions.
Problem 2. The majority of well-known Leibniz classes can be characterized in terms of the behaviour of the so-called Leibniz operator, i.e. the map Ω A : P (A) → ConA, defined on every algebra A, that associates a subset F ⊆ A with the Leibniz congruence Ω A F. Is it possible to establish a precise relation between Leibniz classes and the behaviour of the Leibniz operator?
Later on we make use of the following well-known observation [18] .
Proposition 3.15. The classes of protoalgebraic, equivalential, assertional, order algebraizable, and truth-equational logics comprise only logics with theorems.
Irreducibility, primality and their boundaries
Part of the speculative power of the identification of the Leibniz hierarchy with the lattice of all Leibniz classes comes from the fact that it allows to apply order-theoretic methods and intuitions to the study of the first. To explain how, recall that an element a of a lattice A; ∧, ∨ is said to be meet-irreducible if for every pair b, c ∈ A,
Similarly, a is said to be meet-prime if for every pair b, c ∈ A, if b ∧ c a, then either b a or c a.
Accordingly, a is said to be meet-reducible when it is not meet-irreducible. It is clear that every meet-prime element of A; ∧, ∨ is meet-irreducible, while the converse is not true in general.
Since the Leibniz hierarchy is a lattice (Proposition 2.6), it makes sense to ask whether a Leibniz class is meet-irreducible or meet-prime. An affirmative answer to this question can then be regarded as a certificate that the Leibniz class under consideration captures a primitive or fundamental concept. ∈ K such that ∈ K, for every logic such that 1 , 2 .
Example 4.2. The Leibniz class of algebraizable (resp. weakly algebraizable) logics is meet-reducible, since it can be obtained as the intersection of the strictly larger Leibniz classes of equivalential (resp. protoalgebraic) logics and truth-equational logics (Remark 3.14). Moreover, there are meet-irreducible Leibniz classes that are not meet-prime, e.g. the class of logics for which there is no three-element algebra A and a ∈ A such that A, {a} ∈ Mod ≡ ( ). Even if we do not pursue the details here, the proof of this fact is an adaptation of an argument in [21, pag. 54].
The next results put some boundaries to the expectation that well-known Leibniz classes should be meet-irreducible or meet-prime. Proof sketch. Given a logic with theorems, we denote by ∅ the logic on Fm( ) defined for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm( ) as
It is clear that ∅ lacks theorems. It is not hard to see that
Then consider a Leibniz class K properly included into the Leibniz class Thrms of logics with theorems. We set
It is clear that K K ∅ , since K ∅ contains logics without theorems. Moreover, K = K ∅ ∩ Thrms. Therefore, to conclude that K is meet-reducible, it will be enough to show that K ∅ is a Leibniz class.
To prove this, consider a Leibniz condition
From the fact that Φ is a Leibniz condition and (3) it follows that Φ ∅ is also Leibniz condition. We shall prove that K ∅ = Log(Φ ∅ ). To this end, consider a logic ∈ K. Then there is α ∈ OR such that α . Together with (3), this implies that α ∅ , ∅ . Hence we obtain K ∅ ⊆ Log(Φ ∅ ). To prove the other inclusion, consider α ∈ OR and a logic with an interpretation τ of α ∅ into . If has theorems, then we can use (3) to conclude that τ is also an interpretation of α into , whence ∈ Log(Φ) = K ⊆ K ∅ . Then we consider the case where lacks theorems. Since α ∈ K, the logic α has a theorem ϕ(x). Let y be a variable different from x and observe that y α ∅ ϕ(x). By [24, Prop. 3.3] this yields y τ(ϕ(x)). Then consider the logic + on Fm( ) induced by the class of matrices
Since y τ(ϕ(x)), it is clear that ∅ + τ(ϕ). In particular, this guarantees that Mod ≡ ( + ) is the class of matrices in (4). This fact, together with (3), yields that τ is an interpretation of α into + . As a consequence, we obtain + ∈ K. Since coincides with + ∅ , we conclude that ∈ K ∅ . This establishes that K ∅ = Log(Φ ∅ ) and, therefore, that K is a Leibniz class.
Remark 4.4. Proposition 4.3 indicates that Leibniz classes comprising only logics with theorems (but not all of them) cannot be meet-irreducible in an absolute sense. For this reason, we say that a Leibniz class K is meet-reducible among logics with theorems if for every pair of Leibniz classes K 1 and K 2 comprising logics with theorems only, if
A similar definition applies to the case of meet-prime Leibniz classes. Proof. Let F be the class of logics with theorems such that if A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ), then either the matrix A, F is trivial or |F| 2. Using the characterization of Leibniz classes given in Theorem 2.2(ii) it is not hard to see that F is indeed a Leibniz class. Now, let Asrt be the Leibniz class of assertional logics, and consider an arbitrary Leibniz class K properly included into Asrt. It is clear that both Asrt and F are not included into K. Bearing this in mind, it only remains to show that Asrt ∩ F ⊆ K. To this end, consider a logic ∈ Asrt ∩ F. Observe that every matrix A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ) is such that F is a singleton (as ∈ Asrt) and, therefore, is trivial (as ∈ F). Thus Mod ≡ ( ) is the class of trivial matrices in the language of L . As a consequence, the logic is inconsistent [24, Lem. 7.1]. In particular, this guarantees that is the maximum of Log [24, Thm. 7.3]. By Theorem 2.2(iii) the collection K † is a non-empty filter of Log which implies ∈ K † . Together with K = { : ∈ K † }, this yields ∈ K, as desired.
Meet-prime Leibniz classes
In this section we show that the Leibniz class of all logics with theorems, and the Leibniz class of truth-minimal logics that we introduce below are meet-prime in the absolute sense. On the other hand, it is proved that the Leibniz classes of assertional and truth-equational logics are meet-prime among the logics with theorems. As both assertional and truth-equational logics have theorems, Proposition 4.3 guarantees that the restriction to logics with theorems cannot be dropped here. For the present purpose, it is convenient to start the discussion from the new class of truth-minimal logics.
Truth-minimal logics. Definition A logic is truth-minimal if for every
The next result is instrumental to construct examples of truth-minimal logics.
Proposition 5.2. Let κ be an infinite cardinal and M a class of matrices such that |F| 1 for every A, F ∈ M. The logic induced by M formulated in κ variables is truth-minimal.
Proof. The assumption that |F| 1 for every A, F ∈ M implies that x, y, ϕ(x, z) ϕ(y, z) for every formula ϕ(x, z) ∈ Fm( ). By Proposition 3.8(i) we conclude that is truthminimal.
Our first aim is to show that truth-minimal logics constitute a Leibniz class. To this end, we make use of the following observation: Lemma 5.3. Let { i : i ∈ I} be a family of logics, and A sd i∈I A i where A i is an L ialgebra for every i ∈ I. If G = ∅ is a deductive filter of i∈I i on A, then for every j ∈ I there is a deductive filter G j of j on A j such that G = A ∩ ∏ i∈I G i .
Proof. For every j ∈ I, we denote the natural projection map by π j : A → A j , and set
Then we turn to prove that G = A ∩ ∏ i∈I G i . The inclusion from left to right is clear. To prove the other one, consider an element a ∈ A ∩ ∏ i∈I G i . For every j ∈ I there is c j ∈ G such that c j (j) = a(j). Then consider the basic operation x j y of i∈I i , whose j-th component is the projection on the first coordinate, and whose i-th component is the projection on the second coordinate for every i ∈ I {j}. Since c j (j) = a(j),
Now, consider some distinct variables {y j : j ∈ I} ∪ {x} ⊆ Fm( i∈I i ). Bearing in mind that i∈I i is the logic induced by the class i∈I Mod ≡ ( i ), it is easy to see that the following rule is valid in i∈I i :
Together with (5) and the fact that G is a deductive filter of i∈I i on A, this implies a ∈ G. Hence we conclude
Consider an index j ∈ I. To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that G j is a filter of j on A j . To prove this, suppose that Γ j ϕ and consider a homomorphism
. . , z n ) be an arbitrary basic n-ary operation of i∈I i whose j-th component is ψ. Moreover, consider a variable y ∈ Fm( i∈I i ) not occurring in Γ. 2 Again bearing in mind that i∈I i is the logic induced by the class i∈I Mod ≡ ( i ), it is clear that the following rule is valid in i∈I i :
Now, choose an element a ∈ G, and let f : Fm( i∈I i ) → A be a homomorphism such that f (y) = a and f (x)(j) = h(x) for every variable x ∈ Fm( j ). Observe that there exists such an f , since the projection π j : A → A j is surjective. For every i ∈ I {j} and γ ∈ Γ, we have
Together with (6), this implies
The above display, together with (7) and the fact that G is a deductive filter of i∈I i on A, yields that f (φ j y) ∈ G. As a consequence, we obtain
Hence we conclude that G j is a deductive filter of j on A j .
As a consequence, we obtain the following:
Theorem 5.4. The class of truth-minimal logics is a Leibniz class.
Proof. It is straightforward that the class of truth-minimal logics is closed under termequivalence and compatible expansions. In the light of Theorem 2.2, it only remains to prove that this class is closed under the formation of non-indexed products of sets. To prove this, consider a family { i : i ∈ I} of truth-minimal logics. Moreover, consider A, F , A, G ∈ Mod ≡ ( i∈I i ) with ∅ = G ⊆ F. We need to show that F = G. By [24, Prop. 4.5] there is a family of matrices
and G = A ∩ ∏ i∈I G i . Now, from the fact that G j is a deductive filter of j and
F j is the identity relation, we conclude that the same holds for ∼ Ω A j G j . In particular, this yields
Finally, for every j ∈ J we can apply the fact that j is truth-minimal to (8, 9) , obtaining that F j = G j . As a consequence, we get
Hence we conclude that i∈I i is truth-minimal.
To prove that the Leibniz class of truth-minimal logics is meet-prime, we rely on the following technical observations:
On the other hand, since A, A ∈ Mod ≡ ( ), the congruence ∼ Ω A A is the identity relation. But the fact that A × A is the identity relation implies that A is a singleton, as desired.
Lemma 5.6. Let be a logic, and A,
Proof. Choose an infinite cardinal κ |A| and define B := A κ × A κ . Then set
Observe that since ∅ = G F, the set F contains at least two distinct elements. This fact and ∅ = G F guarantee that
Since F contains at least two elements and A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ), we can apply Lemma 5.5 obtaining F A. Bearing this in mind, we get F † B and
Finally, from κ ω + |A| it follows |B| = |A κ × A κ | = 2 κ . But, together with (10, 11, 12) , this yields 
, and an L 2 -algebra B 2 such that B 1 = B 2 = B, and
Proof. By Lemma 5.6 for every i = 1, 2 there are
Moreover, since
Then consider some sets ∅ = G F B such that (13) and (14) it easily follows that for each i = 1, 2 there is an L i -algebra B i with universe B such that
We are now ready to prove the main result of this part:
Theorem 5.8. The Leibniz class of truth-minimal logics is meet-prime.
Proof. Consider two logics 1 and 2 that are not truth-minimal. It will be enough to construct a logic that is not truth-minimal and in which 1 and 2 are interpretable. To this end, observe that for every i = 1, 2 there are
, and an L 2 -algebra B 2 such that
Let B be the common expansion of B 1 and B 2 with all finitary operations on B. Moreover, let be the logic, formulated in κ := max{|Fm( 1 )|, |Fm( 2 )|} variables induced by the set of matrices
We claim that is equivalential. To prove this, consider elements 0 ∈ B F and 1 ∈ G (this is possible, since ∅ = G and F B). Then let x y be the binary basic operation of B defined as follows for every a, c ∈ B,
Bearing in mind that 0 / ∈ F ∪ G and 1 ∈ F ∩ G, it is not hard to see that the set ∆(x, y) := {x y} satisfies the conditions in the right hand side of [24, Thm. 2.7] . As a consequence we obtain that is equivalential, establishing the claim.
Since B is endowed with all unary constant maps, we have S(K) = K. Moreover, for each pair of different a, c ∈ B, we have
By [24, Prop. 2.2(i)] this implies that the matrices in K are reduced. This fact, together with the claim and S(K) = K, allows us to apply [24, Prop. 3.9] obtaining that the identity maps are interpretations of 1 and 2 into . Moreover, is not truth-minimal, as witnessed by the fact that K ⊆ Mod ≡ ( ) and ∅ = G F.
The proof strategy described above can be adapted to the case of truth-equational and assertional logics, as we proceed to explain.
Truth-equational logics.
To prove that the Leibniz class of truth-equational logics is meet-prime among logics with theorems, it is convenient to recall the following characterization result.
Theorem 5.9. A logic is truth-equational if and only if for every algebra A,
Proof. See [31, Prop. 17 and Thm. 2.8].
As a consequence we obtain the desired result.
Theorem 5.10. The Leibniz class of truth-equational logics is meet-prime among logics with theorems.
Proof. Consider two logics 1 and 2 with theorems that are not truth-equational. It will be enough to construct a logic that is not truth-equational and in which 1 and 2 are interpretable. First we claim that for every i = 1, 2 there are
To prove this, consider i = 1, 2. Since the logic i is not truthequational, we can apply Theorem 5.9 obtaining an algebra A i and distinct
We can assume without loss of generality that V i U i = ∅. Bearing this in mind, we define F i := V i and
G i is also the identity relation and, therefore, A i , G i ∈ Mod ≡ ( i ). Finally, by the assumptions,
This concludes the proof of the claim. Together with Lemma 5.7, the claim implies that there are
for some sets ∅ = G F B, an L 1 -algebra B 1 , and an L 2 -algebra B 2 such that
Now, let B be the common expansion of B 1 and B 2 with all finitary operations on B. Moreover, let be the logic, formulated in κ := max{|Fm( 1 )|, |Fm( 2 )|} variables induced by the set of matrices
As in the proof of Theorem 5.8, we obtain K ⊆ Mod ≡ ( ) and 1 , 2 . Finally, applying Theorem 5.9 to the fact that K ⊆ Mod ≡ ( ) and F = G, we conclude that is not truth-equational.
Assertional logics.
Theorem 5.11. The Leibniz class of assertional logics is meet-prime among logics with theorems.
Proof. Consider two logics 1 and 2 with theorems that are not assertional. As usual, it will be enough to construct a logic that is not assertional and in which 1 and 2 are interpretable.
We claim that for every i = 1, 2 there are
is not a singleton. Since i has theorems and A i , F i is a model of i we know that F i = ∅ and, therefore, |F i | 2. This fact, together with Lemma 5.5, ensures that F i A i , establishing the claim.
By the claim we can find a cardinal κ large enough to guarantee that
Thus there is a set B, a set F ⊆ B, an L 1 -algebra B 1 , and an L 2 -algebra B 2 such that B 1 = B 2 = B and
is closed under the formation of direct powers for every i = 1, 2 [24, Lem.
2.3]
, we obtain B 1 , F ∈ Mod ≡ ( 1 ) and B 2 , F ∈ Mod ≡ ( 2 ). Now, let B be the common expansion of B 1 and B 2 with all finitary operations on B. Moreover, let be the logic, formulated in κ := max{|Fm( 1 )|, |Fm( 2 )|} variables induced by the matrix B, F . As in the proof of Theorem 5.8, we obtain B, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ) and 1 , 2 . Finally, since B, F and F is not a singleton, we conclude that is not assertional.
Remark 5.12. In Theorems 5.10 and 5.11 it is shown that the Leibniz classes of truthequational and assertional logics are meet-prime among logics with theorems. As we mentioned, in the light of Proposition 4.3 this restriction cannot be dropped.
Logics with theorems.
Theorem 5.13. The Leibniz class of logics with theorems is meet-prime.
Proof. Let AI be an almost inconsistent logic, and recall that if is a logic without theorems, then AI [24, Thm. 7.3] . Together with the fact that IA lacks theorems, this immediately implies that the Leibniz class of logics with theorems is meet-prime.
Meet-reducible Leibniz classes
Recall that protoalgebraic, equivalential, and order algebraizable logics have theorems. In the light of Proposition 4.3 the corresponding Leibniz classes are trivially meetreducible. In this section we strengthen this result by proving that they remain meetreducible even among the restricted setting of logics with theorems. In addition, it is shown that the Leibniz class of parametrically truth-equational logics is meet-reducible in the absolute sense.
3 Remarkably, the latter result cannot be inferred directly from Proposition 4.3, since parametrically truth-equational logics need not have theorems [27, Sec. 4] . In what follows we rely on the next technical observation: Proposition 6.1. Let 1 , 2 , and be logics, and τ an interpretation of 1 2 into . Then for every A,
, and an isomorphism f :
Moreover, for every submatrix B, F ∩ B ⊆ A, F and i = 1, 2, there is a submatrix B i , F i ∩ B i ⊆ A i , F i such that: (i) the following restriction of f is a well-defined isomorphism:
(ii) if F ∩ B = ∅, then for every θ ∈ ConB compatible with F ∩ B and every i = 1, 2, there is θ i ∈ ConB i compatible with F i ∩ B i such that
Proof. The fact that there are A 1 ,
, and an isomorphism f : 
As a consequence, we obtain
(ii): Consider θ ∈ ConB compatible with F ∩ B. Clearly θ ∈ ConB τ = Con(B 1 B 2 ). As shown in [35, Lem. 1.12], for every i = 1, 2 there is θ i ∈ ConB i such that θ = { a, b , c, d : a, c ∈ θ 1 and b, d ∈ θ 2 }. We turn to prove that θ 1 is compatible with F 1 ∩ B 1 . To this end, consider a, c ∈ B 1 such that a ∈ F 1 ∩ B 1 and a, c ∈ θ 1 . From the assumption we have (
From the above display it follows that a, b , c, b ∈ θ. Since θ is compatible with F and a, b ∈ F 1 × F 2 = F, we get c, b ∈ F = F 1 × F 2 . In particular, this guarantees that c ∈ F 1 ∩ B 1 . As a consequence we conclude that θ 1 is compatible with F 1 ∩ B 1 . A similar argument shows that θ 2 is compatible with F 2 ∩ B 2 .
Protoalgebraic logics.
Our aim is to show that the Leibniz class of protoalgebraic logics is meet-reducible among logics with theorems. To this end, it is useful to recall a few concepts. An algebra A is said to be congruence uniform [3, Sec. 7.1] if |a/θ| = |b/θ|, for every a, b ∈ A and θ ∈ ConA. It is well-known that Boolean algebras are congruence uniform.
We denote by BA the variety of Boolean algebras, and by * BA the logic formulated in countably many variables induced by the following class of matrices: { A, F : A ∈ BA and 1 ∈ F}. We consider the four-element Boolean algebra A with universe {a, b, 0, 1}, where 0 and 1 are respectively the bottom and the top element of the lattice order. Then we set F := {1, a} and G := {1, a, b}. From the definition of * BA it follows that A, F , A, G ∈ Mod( * BA ). Together with the fact that ∆ is a set of congruence formulas with parameters for * BA and that F ⊆ G, this yields that for every p, q ∈ A,
Hence we conclude that Ω A F ⊆ Ω A G. On the other hand, it is easy to see that Ω A G is the identity relation, while Ω A F is the congruence with blocks {1, a} and {0, b}. But this contradicts the fact that Ω A F ⊆ Ω A G, as desired.
We denote by Proto the Leibniz class of protoalgebraic logics, and by Asrt that of assertional logics. Bearing this in mind, we obtain the following result, in which suprema are taken in the Leibniz hierarchy. Theorem 6.3. The Leibniz class of protoalgebraic logics is meet-reducible among logics with theorems, and can be described as follows:
Proof. We set K 1 := Proto ∨ Asrt and K 2 := Proto ∨ Log( * BA ). Observe that K 1 and K 2 are Leibniz classes by Theorems 3.4 and 3.11. Moreover, they comprise only logics with theorems by Propositions 2.6 and 3.15. We have
The validity of the inclusion Proto ⊆ K 1 ∩ K 2 is straightforward. The fact that Proto K 1 is witnessed by the existence of assertional logics that are not protoalgebraic [31, Ex. 7] . Finally, the fact that the inclusion Equiv ⊆ K 2 is strict follows from Lemma 6.2.
In the light of (15), it only remains to prove that K 1 ∩ K 2 ⊆ Proto. Suppose the contrary, with a view to contradiction. Then there is a logic ∈ K 1 ∩ K 2 that is not protoalgebraic. By Proposition 2.6, and considering that the non-indexed product of two protoalgebraic logics is protoalgebraic and interpretable in each of them, there are a protoalgebraic logic pr and an assertional logic as such that pr as and pr * BA .
Since has theorems and is not protoalgebraic, we can apply Theorem 3.1(ii) obtaining that Mod ≡ ( ) = R(Mod ≡ ( )), i.e. that there is a matrix A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ) such that Ω A F is not the identity relation. We claim that for every pair of different a, c ∈ A, if a, c ∈ Ω A F, then a, c / ∈ F. To prove this, consider different a, c ∈ A such that a, c ∈ Ω A F. By (16) there is an interpretation τ of pr as into . By Proposition 6.1 we obtain without loss of generality that
there are a 1 , c 1 ∈ A 1 and a 2 , c 2 ∈ A 2 such that a = a 1 , a 2 and c = c 1 , c 2 .
From Proposition 6.1(ii) it follows that there are θ 1 ∈ ConA 1 and θ 2 ∈ ConA 2 compatible with F 1 and F 2 , respectively, such that
Since pr is protoalgebraic and A 1 , F 1 ∈ Mod ≡ ( pr ), we can apply Theorem 3.1(ii) obtaining that Ω A 1 F 1 is the identity relation. Together with the fact that θ 1 ⊆ Ω A 1 F 1 and (17), this yields
Since a, c ∈ Ω A F and a = c, we conclude that a 2 = c 2 and a 2 , c 2 ∈ θ 2 . Now, from the fact that θ 2 is compatible with F 2 and a 2 , c 2 ∈ θ 2 , it follows
Since as is assertional and A 2 , F 2 ∈ Mod ≡ ( as ), we know that F 2 is a singleton. Together with a 2 = c 2 and (19), this yields that a 2 , c 2 / ∈ F 2 . As a consequence, we obtain a, c / ∈ F 1 × F 2 = F, establishing the claim. Now, by (16) there is an interpretation τ of pr * BA into . By Proposition 6.1 we obtain without loss of generality that
Recall that the matrix A, F is not reduced. Then there are different a, c ∈ A such that a, c ∈ Ω A F. Since A = A 1 × A 2 , there are a 1 , c 1 ∈ A 1 and a 2 , c 2 ∈ A 2 such that a = a 1 , a 2 and c = c 1 , c 2 .
As in the proof of the claim, we obtain Ω A F = { p, q , p, s : p ∈ A 1 and q, s ∈ θ} (20) for some θ ∈ ConA 2 compatible with F 2 . Then we choose elements e 1 ∈ F 1 and e 2 ∈ F 2 (the fact that the logics pr and * BA have theorems guarantees F 1 , F 2 = ∅). Clearly we have
Together with a = c and a, c ∈ Ω A F, the display (20) Together with (21) this contradicts the claim. This produces the desired contradiction.
Equivalential logics.
To prove that the Leibniz class of equivalential logics is meetreducible among logics with theorems, we need to introduce a new concept:
Definition 6.4. A formula ϕ(x) is an injective theorem of a logic if ϕ(x) is a theorem of and for every
We will rely on the following:
Proposition 6.5. Logics with an injective theorem form a Leibniz class, comprising a protoalgebraic non-equivalential logic.
The proof of the above result proceeds through a series of technical observations.
Fact 1. Logics with an injective theorem form a Leibniz class.
Proof. It is not hard to show that logics with an injective theorem are closed under term-equivalence, compatible expansions, and non-indexed products of sets. In the light of Theorem 2.2 this implies that they form a Leibniz class.
Consider the logic ∇ , formulated in countably many variables and in the language consisting of a single binary connective →, axiomatized by the following rules:
The logic ∇ has been studied in depth in [15, 16, 17] . We set ∇(x, y) := {x → y}.
Fact 2. The logic ∇ is protoalgebraic with set of congruence formulas with parameterŝ
Proof. The logic ∇ is protoalgebraic, since the set ∇(x, y) satisfies the requirements of Theorem 3.1(iv). By the same theorem,∇ is a set of congruence formulas for ∇ .
Fact 3. For every formula ϕ ∈ Fm( ∇ ), Proof. This is a consequence of Fact 2, together with the fact that protoalgebraicity is preserved by extensions.
Fact 5.
The formula x → x is an injective theorem of ∆ .
Proof. Clearly x → x is a theorem of ∆ . Then consider A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ∆ ) and a, b ∈ A such that a → A a = b → A b. We need to show that a = b. To this end, recall by Fact 4 that ∆ is protoalgebraic. Then we can apply Theorem 3.1(iii), obtaining that the matrix A, F is reduced, i.e. that the congruence Ω A F is the identity relation. Therefore, to conclude the proof, it will be enough to show that a, b ∈ Ω A F. By [24, Prop. 2.2(i)] this amounts to establishing that for every formula ϕ(x, z) ∈ Fm( ∆ ) and every c ∈ A,
To prove the implication from left to right, consider ϕ(x, z) ∈ Fm( ∆ ) and c ∈ A such that ϕ A (a, c) ∈ F. Consider also an arbitrary formula ψ(x, z) ∈ Fm( ∇ ). We have that ψ(x, z) → ψ(x, z) is a theorem of ∆ . Together with the fact that a → A a = b → A b, this yields
Hence we conclude that∇(a → A a, b → A b, c) ⊆ F. Since A, F is a model of (22) , this implies∇(a, b, c) ⊆ F. As a consequence, we obtain ϕ A (a, c) → ϕ A (b, c) ∈ F. Together with the assumption that ϕ A (a, c) ∈ F, and the fact that A, F is a model of the rule x, x → y £ y, this implies ϕ A (b, c) ∈ F. This concludes the proof of the left to right implication in (23) . The proof of the other implication is analogous. From (23) it follows that a, b ∈ Ω A F and, therefore, a = b.
Now, recall that a rule Γ £ ϕ is admissible [34] in a logic , if its addition to does not produce new theorems. Equivalently, this means that ∅ σϕ, for every substitution σ such that ∅ σ [Γ] . Proof. To prove this, consider a substitution σ such that
As a consequence, we obtain ∅ ∇ (σx → σx) → (σy → σy). By Fact 3 this implies σx → σx = σy → σy and, therefore, σx = σy. Since ∅ ∇ x → x and σx = σy, we obtain ∅ ∇ σϕ(x, z) → σϕ(y, z), for every formula ϕ(x, z) ∈ Fm( ∇ ). But this amounts to the fact that ∅ ∇ σ[∇(x, y, z)]. Hence we conclude that the rules in (22) are admissible in ∇ .
Given a formula ϕ, we denote by Var(ϕ) the set of variables occurring in ϕ. Proof. Suppose, with a view to contradiction, that ∆ is equivalential. Then ∆ has a set of congruence formulas ∆(x, y).
We claim that ∅ ∆ ϕ, for every formula ϕ such that ∆(x, y) ∆ ϕ and Var(ϕ) {x, y}. To demonstrate this, we reason by complete induction on the length of proofs in ∆ . Consider an ordinal α, and suppose that ∅ ∆ ψ, for every formula ψ such that Var(ϕ) {x, y}, and of which the exists a proof indexed by an ordinal < α from ∆(x, y). Now, let π := {γ β : β < α} be a proof of a formula ϕ such that Var(ϕ) {x, y} from ∆(x, y). If ϕ is a substitution instance of the axiom x → x, then it is a theorem and we are done. Moreover, observe that ϕ / ∈ ∆(x, y), since Var(ϕ) {x, y}. Therefore, ϕ is obtained by the application of one of the inference rules of ∆ to a proper initial segment of π.
First consider the case where ϕ is obtained by an application of the rule x, x → y £ y. Then there is some formula ψ such that ψ and ψ → ϕ appear in a proper initial segment of π. Since Var(ϕ) {x, y}, then Var(ψ → ϕ) ⊆ {x, y}. Therefore we can apply the induction hypothesis obtaining ∅ ∆ ψ → ϕ. By Fact 6 we get ∅ ∇ ψ → ϕ. Moreover, by Fact 3 this yields ψ = ϕ. In particular, this implies Var(ψ) {x, y}. Therefore we can apply the induction hypothesis, obtaining ∅ ∆ ψ. Since ϕ = ψ, we conclude that ∅ ∆ ϕ, as desired.
Then we consider the case where ϕ is obtained by an application of one of the rules in (22) . Then there is a substitution σ and a formula ψ(x, y, z) ∈∇(x, y, z) such that ϕ = σψ, and each element of σ[∇(x → x, y → y, z)] appears in a proper initial segment of π. Suppose, with a view to contradiction, that ∅ ∆ σψ. Since ψ ∈∇(x, y, z), there is a formula γ(x, y, z) ∈ Fm( ∇ ) such that ψ = γ(x, y, z) → γ(y, y, z). Together with the fact that ∅ ∆ x → x and ∅ ∆ σψ, this yields σ(γ(x, y, z)) = σ(γ(y, y, z)). But this easily implies σx = σy and x ∈ Var(γ(x, y, z)). As a consequence we obtain σ(γ(x → x, y → y, z)) = σ(γ(y → y, y → y, z)). Moreover, from Facts 6 and 3, this yields
which amounts to
Now, from the fact that Var(σψ) = Var(ϕ) {x, y} it follows
The above display and the fact that σψ(x → x, y → y, z) ∈ σ[∇(x → x, y → y, z)] allow us to apply the induction hypothesis, obtaining
But this contradicts (24) . Hence we conclude that ∅ ∆ σψ, establishing the claim. Now we move back to the main proof. First observe that
To prove this, consider A, F ∈ Mod( ∆ ) and a, b, c ∈ A such that ∆ A (a, b) ⊆ F. Since ∆ is a set of congruence formulas for ∆ , this yields a, b ∈ Ω A F and, therefore,
As Ω A F is compatible with F, this implies (a → c) → (b → c) ∈ F, establishing (25) . From (25) and the claim it follows that ∅ ∆ (x → z) → (y → z). By Facts 6 and 3 this yields x → z = y → z, which is false.
We also rely on the following result [18, Thm. We denote by Equiv and Injctv the Leibniz classes of equivalential logics and of logics with an an injective theorem, respectively. Bearing this in mind, the main result of this part takes the following form:
Theorem 6.7. The Leibniz class of equivalential logics is meet-reducible among logics with theorems, and can be described as follows:
Proof. We begin by setting
The fact that K 1 and K 2 are Leibniz classes is a consequence of Theorems 3.4, 3.7, and 3.11, and Proposition 6.5. Moreover, they comprise only logics with theorems by Propositions 2.6 and 3.15. We have Equiv K 1 and Equiv K 2 .
The validity of the inclusion Equiv ⊆ K 1 ∩ K 2 is straightforward. Moreover, Proposition 6.5 guarantees that Equiv K 1 . Finally, the fact that the inclusion Equiv ⊆ K 2 is strict follows from the following observation [13, Prop. 6.1 and Thm. 6.4]:
In the light of (26), it only remains to prove K 1 ∩ K 2 ⊆ Equiv. Suppose the contrary, with a view to contradiction. Then there is a logic ∈ K 1 ∩ K 2 that is not equivalential. By Proposition 2.6 there are an equivalential logic eq , a protoalgebraic logic with an injective theorem pin , and an assertional protoalgebraic logic ap such that eq pin and eq ap .
Together with [24, Prop. 3.8] this implies that is term-equivalent to a compatible expansion of the non-indexed product of a pair of protoalgebraic logics. Since protoalgebraic logics form a Leibniz class, by Theorem 2.2(ii) we conclude that is protoalgebraic. Moreover, since is not equivalential, we can apply Theorem 6.6 obtaining that Mod ≡ ( ) is not closed under S, i.e. there is a matrix A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ) with a submatrix B, F ∩ B ⊆ A, F such that B, F ∩ B / ∈ Mod ≡ ( ). We claim that for every pair of different a, c ∈ B, if a, c ∈ Ω B (F ∩ B), then a, b / ∈ F. To prove this, consider different a, c ∈ B such that a, c ∈ Ω B (F ∩ B). By (28) there is an interpretation τ of eq ap into . By Proposition 6.1(i) we obtain without loss of generality that
Since a, c ∈ B = B 1 × B 2 , there are a 1 , c 1 ∈ B 1 and a 2 , c 2 ∈ B 2 such that a = a 1 , a 2 and c = c 1 , c 2 .
Again from Proposition 6.1(ii) it follows that there are θ 1 ∈ ConB 1 and θ 2 ∈ ConB 2 compatible with F 1 ∩ B 1 and F 2 ∩ B 2 , respectively, such that Ω B (F ∩ B) = { p, q , r, s : p, r ∈ θ 1 and q, s ∈ θ 2 }.
Together with the fact that a, c ∈ Ω B (F ∩ B), this yields
Since eq is equivalential, we can apply Theorem 6.6 obtaining that Mod ≡ ( eq ) is closed under S. Together with A 1 ,
. As a consequence, the congruence Ω B 1 (F 1 ∩ B 1 ) is the identity relation. Hence by (28) we get a 1 = c 1 . Since a = c, we conclude that a 2 = c 2 .
Now, from (28) and the fact that
Since pa is assertional and A 2 , F 2 ∈ Mod ≡ ( pa ), we know that F 2 is a singleton. Together with a 2 = c 2 and (29), this yields a 2 , c 2 / ∈ F 2 ∩ B 2 . As a consequence, we obtain a, c / ∈ F 1 × F 2 = F, establishing the claim. Now, by (28) there is an interpretation τ of eq pin into . By Proposition 6.1(i) we obtain without loss of generality that
Recall that the matrix B, F ∩ B is not reduced. Then there are different a, c ∈ B such that a, c ∈ Ω B (F ∩ B). Since B = B 1 × B 2 , there are a 1 , c 1 ∈ B 1 and a 2 , c 2 ∈ B 2 such that a = a 1 , a 2 and c = c 1 , c 2 .
As in the proof of the claim, we obtain a 2 = c 2 and
Let also (x) be an arbitrary theorem of eq . Since A 1 , F 1 ∈ Mod( eq ), we have
Observe that the pair , ϕ is a unary connective of eq pld . Together with (30, 31) , this yields
Since B 1 B 2 = B τ , we know that , ϕ B 1 B 2 is a term-function of B. Together with the above displays and the fact that a, c ∈ Ω B (F ∩ B), this implies that Ω B (F ∩ B) identifies two different elements of F, i.e. , ϕ B 1 B 2 (a) and , ϕ B 1 B 2 (c). But this contradicts the claim. Hence we reached a contradiction, as desired.
6.3. Order algebraizable logics. We denote by Order and Truth the Leibniz classes of order algebraizable and truth-equational logics, respectively. Theorem 6.8. The Leibniz class of order algebraizable logics is meet-reducible among logics with theorems, and can be described as follows:
Proof. First we set K := Order ∨ Truth. Observe that K and Equiv are Leibniz classes by Theorems 3.7, 3.12, and 3.13. The fact that they comprise only logics with theorems is a consequence of Propositions 2.6 and 3.15. Moreover, we have Order K and Order Equiv.
To prove this, recall that every order algebraizable logic is equivalential [32, Prop. 7.11(iii)].
In particular, this implies that Order ⊆ K ∩ Equiv. The fact that the inclusion Order ⊆ K is strict is an immediate consequence of the fact that so is the inclusion Equiv ⊆ K 2 in the proof of Theorem 6.7. On the other hand, the fact that Order Equiv is witnessed by the existence of equivalential logics that are not order algebraizable [32, p. 267] .
In the light of (32), it only remains to prove that K ∩ Equiv ⊆ Order. To this end, consider a logic ∈ K ∩ Equiv. Clearly, is equivalential and, therefore, there is a set of formulas ∆(x, y) of such that for every A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ) and a, c ∈ A,
Moreover, since ∈ K, there are an order algebraizable logic or , a truth-equational logic tr , and an interpretation τ of or tr into . Then there there are a set of formulas ∇(x, y) and a set of inequalities I(x) of or such that for every A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( or ), Finally, since tr is truth-equational, there is a set of equations E(x) of tr such that for every A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( tr ) and a ∈ A a ∈ F ⇐⇒ A E(a).
Now, we choose a theorem of tr , and for every formula ϕ ∈ ∇(x, y) we consider the following basic operations of or tr , in which π i is the projection map on the i-th coordinate:φ (x, y) := ϕ(x 1 , x 2 ), (x 1 )
Observe that for every L or -algebra A 1 , L tr -algebra A 2 , and elements a 1 , a 2 , c 1 ,
Then we define the following sets of formulas and inequalities of :
To conclude the proof, it will be enough to show that the sets ∇ * and I * witness the order algebraizability of . To this end, consider a matrix A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( ), and let A F be the relation on A defined for every a, c ∈ A as
We need to show that A F is a partial order on A and that for every a ∈ A, a ∈ F ⇐⇒ A,
We claim that for every a 1 , a 2 , c 1 ,
To prove this, observe that
The above equivalences are justified as follows: the first, the second, and the sixth are straightforward, the third follows from the fact that A τ = A 1 A 2 , the fourth is a consequence of (35) , and the fifth follows from (33) and the observation that F = F 1 × F 2 and A 2 (a 2 ) ∈ F 2 . This establishes the claim.
Recall that
is a partial order on A 1 by (i). Together with the claim, this implies that A F is a partial order on A. Then consider an element a 1 , a 2 ∈ A 1 × A 2 = A. We have
The above equivalences are justified as follows: the first is a consequence of the equality F = F 1 × F 2 , the second follows from (ii) and (34) , and the third from the claim. This establishes (36) . Hence we conclude that is order algebraizable.
6.4. Parametrically truth-equational logics. As we mentioned, parametrically truthequational logics need not have theorems in general [27, Sec. 4] . In particular, they lie outside the scope of Proposition 4.3 and we cannot immediately infer that their Leibniz class is meet-reducible in the absolute sense. We proceed to prove that this is indeed the case. To this end, we need the following observation:
Proposition 6.9. Every parametrically truth-equational logic is truth-minimal, but the converse does not hold in general.
Proof. Let be a parametrically truth-equational logic. Then consider two matrices
Let also E(x, y) be the set of equations that witnesses the fact that is parametrically truth-equational. Since A, F , A, G ∈ Mod ≡ ( ) and F, G = ∅, for every a ∈ A we have a ∈ F ⇐⇒ A E(a, c) for every c ∈ A ⇐⇒ a ∈ G.
As a consequence we obtain F = G and, therefore, that is truth-minimal. This establishes that every parametrically truth-equational logic is truth-minimal.
To conclude the proof, we need to exhibit a truth-minimal logic that is not parametrically truth-equational. To this end, let be the logic formulated in countably many variables induced by the set of matrices { B 2 , {1} , B 2 , {0} }, where B 2 is the two-element Boolean algebra with universe {0, 1}. By Proposition 5.2 the logic is truth-minimal. Now, since B 2 is a two-element algebra, it is immediate that the matrices B 2 , {1} and B 2 , {0} are reduced. As a consequence, we obtain
Suppose, with a view to contradiction, that is parametrically truth-equational, and let E(x, y) be the set of equations witnessing this fact. We have
The first implication above follows from the fact that B 2 , {1} ∈ Mod ≡ ( ), the second from B 2 , {0} ∈ Mod ≡ ( ), and the third is straightforward. Since 0 = 1, this produces a contradiction. Hence we conclude that is not parametrically truth-equational.
Given a logic and an L -algebra A, we denote by Fi A the set of deductive filters of on A. We build on the following characterization result. Theorem 6.10. A logic is parametrically truth-equational if and only if for every L -algebra A and every family X ∪ {F} ⊆ Fi A {∅},
Proof. The result is essentially a re-working of an analogous characterization of truthequational logics in [31] . For the details, see [27, Thm. 3.9] .
We denote by Thrms, ParTruth, and Mnml the Leibniz classes of logics with theorems, parametrically truth-equational logics, and truth-minimal logics respectively. Theorem 6.11. The Leibniz class of parametrically truth-equational logics is meet-reducible, and can be described as follows:
(Thrms ∨ ParTruth) ∩ Mnml.
Proof. First we set K := Thrms ∨ ParTruth, and observe that K and Mnml are Leibniz classes by Theorems 3.12, 3.13, and 5.4. Moreover, we have ParTruth K and ParTruth Mnml.
The validity of the inclusion ParTruth ⊆ K is straightforward. The fact that it is strict is witnessed by the existence of logics with theorems that are not parametrically truthequational, e.g. [27, Ex. 7.5] . On the other hand, from Proposition 6.9 it follows that ParTruth Mnml.
In the light of (37), it only remains to prove that K ∩ Mnml ⊆ ParTruth. To this end, consider a logic ∈ K ∩ Mnml. Clearly, is truth-minimal, and there are a parametrically truth-equational logic pt , and a logic with theorems thm such that pt thm . Then let τ be an interpretation of pt thm into . In order to establish that is parametrically truth-equational, we rely on Theorem 6.10. Consider an L -algebra on A, and a family X ∪ {F} ⊆ Fi A {∅} such that
To conclude the proof it suffices to show that X ⊆ F. If X = ∅, we are done. Then we consider the case where X is non-empty. For the sake of readability, we set H := X and θ := ∼ Ω A X. From the fact that A/θ, H/θ ∈ Mod ≡ ( ) and [1, Prop. 4.12] , it follows that
As a consequence, θ is compatible with F and, therefore, F/θ ∈ Fi (A/θ). Together with the fact that τ is an interpretation of pt thm into and [24, Prop. 3.3] , this yields F/θ ∈ Fi pt thm ((A/θ) τ ) and F/θ = ∅.
With an application of Lemma 5.3 to the above display and (39), we conclude that
We claim that H/θ ∩ F/θ = ∅. To prove this, consider the family Y := {G ∈ Fi pt A 1 : H 1 ⊆ G}. We have
where the inclusion ∼ Ω 
establishing the claim. Now, observe that the intersection Z := H/θ ∩ F/θ is clearly a deductive filter of on A/θ. Together with the fact that Z ⊆ H/θ, this implies
Since the latter congruence is the identity, so is ∼ Ω A Z and, therefore, A/θ, Z ∈ Mod ≡ ( ). This fact, together with the claim and Z ⊆ H/θ, implies
Since θ is compatible both with H and F, we conclude that X = H ⊆ F.
Meet-prime logics
Traditional abstract algebraic logic tends to attribute the status of fundamental concepts both to protoalgebraic and equivalential logics. Unfortunately, this intuition does not match the fact that, when regarded as Leibniz classes, protoalgebraic and equivalential logics happen to be meet-reducible in the Leibniz hierarchy (Theorems 6.3 and 6.7). With an eye towards softening this apparent incoherence, we shall explore a different sense in which a Leibniz class can be considered to capture a primitive or fundamental concept. Definition 7.1. A logic is meet-prime when is meet-prime in Log.
A Leibniz class class can then also be considered primitive or fundamental when it is induced by a Leibniz condition whose members are meet-prime logics. In this section we show that this is indeed the case for protoalgebraic, equivalential, and assertional logics.
5
It is convenient to start with the case of protoalgebraic logics. Recall that for every infinite cardinal κ, the basic protoalgebraic logic of rank κ is denoted by κ P (Definition 3.2). Our aim is to prove the following: Theorem 7.2. For every infinite cardinal κ > 0, the logic κ P is meet-prime. As a consequence, we obtain the desired result. The proof of Theorem 7.2 proceeds through a series of technical observations. Given a pair of infinite cardinals κ and ν, we let { A j , F j : j ∈ J κν } be the set of ν-generated matrices in Mod ≡ ( κ P ) up to isomorphism. We can assume without loss of generality that the various algebras A j have disjoint universes. Then let λ κν := max{ω, | j∈J κν A j |} and consider the sets
where ⊥, , p α are new distinct elements. We endow A κν with the structure of an L κ P -algebra A κν stipulating that for every α < κ, 0 < n ∈ ω, and a, b, c 1 , . . . , c n ∈ A κν , 
Fact 9. For every pair of infinite cardinals κ and ν, and j ∈ J κν ,
To establish that A κν , F κν ∈ Mod ≡ ( κ P ), it suffices to prove that the matrix A κν , F κν is a reduced model of κ P . The fact that it is reduced is justified as follows. Consider two distinct elements a, b ∈ A κν . We have to prove that a, b / ∈ Ω A κν F κν . First we consider the case where there is j ∈ J κν such that a, b ∈ A j . Since κ P is protoalgebraic and A j , F j ∈ Mod ≡ ( κ P ), we can apply Theorem 3.1(ii), obtaining that the matrix A j , F j is reduced. In particular, we can assume without loss of generality that there is a unary polynomial function p of A j such that p(a) ∈ F j and p(b)
Then we consider the case where the is no j ∈ J κν such that a, b ∈ A j . Choose an arbitrary α < κ, and consider the unary polynomial function p(
On the other hand, we shall see that p(a) ∈ F κν . If a ∈ A j for some j ∈ J κν , then we have
Hence we conclude that p(a) ∈ F κν . Together with the fact that p(b) / ∈ F κν and [24, Prop.
2.2(i)], this implies a, b /
∈ Ω A κν F κν . We conclude that A κν , F κν is reduced. It only remains to show that A κν , F κν ∈ Mod( κ P ), i.e. that A κν , F κν is a model of the rules ∅ £ ∆ κ (x, x) and x, ∆ κ (x, y) £ y. We detail only the case of x, ∆ κ (x, y) £ y, since the other one is similar. Consider a, b ∈ A κν such that {a} ∪ ∆ A κν (a, b) ⊆ F κν . First we consider the case where b ∈ A j for some j ∈ J κν . Looking at the definition of A κν , it is not hard to see that the fact that b ∈ A j and ∆ A κν (a, b) ⊆ F κν implies a, b ∈ A j . In particular, this guarantees that 
It only remains to prove that either B 1 , G 1 or B 2 , G 2 is trivial. Suppose the contrary, with a view to contradiction. We have
The first inequality above follows from the fact that, by Lemma 5.5, G i B i for every i = 1, 2. The second one is obvious, and the third one follows from (41). Now, recall that |A κν | λ + κν ω. Thus the set A κν = B 1 × B 2 is infinite, whence so is either B 1 or B 2 . In particular, this implies |B 1 | + |B 2 | = |B 1 × B 2 | = |A κν |. Together with the above display, this yields |F κν | |A κν | |A κν F κν |.
But this is in contradiction with Fact 8.
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Consider an infinite cardinal κ. Our aim is to show that the logic κ P is meet-prime. To this end, consider two logics 1 and 2 with an interpretation τ of 1 2 into κ P . Then let τ 1 be the translation of L 1 into L κ P defined for every n-ary * ∈ L 1 as τ 1 ( * ) := τ( * (x 1 , . . . , x n ), x 1 ).
The above definition is sound, since the pair * (x 1 , . . . , x n ), x 1 can be regarded as a basic n-ary operation of 1 2 . Let also τ 2 be the translation of L 2 into L κ P defined analogously.
We claim that for every infinite cardinal ν, there is i = 1, 2 such that (Definition 3.5 ). An argument, similar to the one described above, yields the following conclusion: Theorem 7.4. For every infinite cardinal κ > 0, the logic κ E is meet-prime. As a consequence, the class of equivalential logics has the form Log(Φ) for some Leibniz condition Φ consisting of meet-prime logics.
Recall that the basic assertional logic is denoted by A (Definition 3.9) . We have the following: Theorem 7.5. The logic A is meet-prime. As a consequence, the class of assertional logics has the form Log(Φ) for a strong Leibniz condition Φ consisting of a meet-prime logic.
Proof. In the light to Theorem 3.11 it will be enough to show that A is meet-prime. To this end, consider two logics 1 
To prove that τ 1 is an interpretation, consider a matrix A, F ∈ Mod ≡ ( A ). By Proposition 3.10 we know that A is a pointed set and F = { A * }. In particular, this easily implies A, F ∈ P sd ( 2, { 2 * }), whence A τ 1 , F ∈ P sd ( 2 τ 1 , { 2 * } ). By (44) this guarantees that A τ 1 , F ∈ Mod ≡ ( 1 ). Hence we conclude that τ 1 is an interpretation of 1 into A , whence 1 A . This shows that A is meet-prime, as desired.
